Last edited by Mikale
Thursday, August 6, 2020 | History

2 edition of Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing? found in the catalog.

Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?

Antonio Rangel

Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?

by Antonio Rangel

  • 11 Want to read
  • 20 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Intergenerational relations -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models.,
  • Intergenerational relations -- Political aspects -- Econometric models.,
  • Generational accounting -- Econometric models.,
  • Risk -- Sociological aspects -- Econometric models.,
  • Voting -- Econometric models.

  • Edition Notes

    Other titlesIntergenerational risk sharing
    StatementAntonio Rangel, Richard Zeckhauser.
    SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 6949, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 6949.
    ContributionsZeckhauser, Richard., National Bureau of Economic Research.
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHB1 .W654 no. 6949
    The Physical Object
    Pagination33 p. :
    Number of Pages33
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL22399822M

    3 Individuals have access to a capital market with a risky return rt+ size of the gen-eration born in t is denote the ratio between generations born in t+1 and t, i.e., Nt+1/Nt, by 1+nt+1, so nt+1 is the rate of population growth.2 At each time period t, three exogenous stochastic variables are realized: wt the wage of the young generation in t, rt the rate of return on the. Intergenerational Risk Sharing MLongevity risk involves very long time horizons MIndividual level: start saving at 40, may live to => 60 years. MLongevity risk has aggregate components. MMedical innovations may change aggregate longevity MAggregate risks cannot be diversified – best shared widely MNet exposure to longevity risk varies across cohorts.

    Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Stability and Optimality of Alternative Pension Systems show that only a fixed-fee pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems can provide intergenerational risk sharing for living individuals. Under some circumstances, however, marginal return to fees paid equals the capital market return. Can the labor market Cited by:   Intergenerational Risk Sharing Within Funded Pension Schemes We show that well-structured intergenerational risk sharing is a zero-sum game in market value terms, but can be welfare-enhancing.

    Merton (), considers the potential for intergenerational risk sharing by means of pay-as-you-go (paygo) social security programs. This issue reflects the insight that a paygo program is in effect a government created asset that permits one generation to trade in the human capital returns of the next. Sufficient conditions on the structure of the economy for such intergenerational risk pooling to be mutually beneficial to all members of society are derived. Although it is logically possible to satisfy them1 we argue that they are unlikely to be realized empirically in an economy similar to that of the United States.


Share this book
You might also like
Erare humanum est

Erare humanum est

A Report on the potential for the conversion of some railway routes in London into roads

A Report on the potential for the conversion of some railway routes in London into roads

How to Prove Astrology

How to Prove Astrology

March to the sound of the guns

March to the sound of the guns

introduction to chromatography

introduction to chromatography

California freemasonry, 1850-2000

California freemasonry, 1850-2000

The History of Prostitution

The History of Prostitution

Why Wait? Kick the Procrastination Habit And Start Managing Your Life

Why Wait? Kick the Procrastination Habit And Start Managing Your Life

Janes world railways, 1971-72

Janes world railways, 1971-72

Iceland Adventure

Iceland Adventure

passion for meddling.

passion for meddling.

American survey

American survey

Women Plantation Workers

Women Plantation Workers

Standard Catalog of World Coins

Standard Catalog of World Coins

Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing? by Antonio Rangel Download PDF EPUB FB2

Unlike most of that literature, we study both ex-ante and interim risk-sharing. Our main conclusion is that both types of institutions have serious problems.

Markets cannot generate ex-ante risk-sharing because agents can trade only after they are born. Downloadable. Janu Are market and voting institutions capable of producing optimal intergenerational risk-sharing.

To study this question we consider a simple endowment economy with uncertainty and overlapping generations. Endowments are stochastic; thus it is possible to increase the welfare of every generation using intergenerational transfers that might depend on the state of.

Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing. Downloadable. Are market and voting institutions capable of producing optimal intergenerational risk-sharing.

To study this question, we consider a simple endowment economy with uncertainty and overlapping generations. Endowments are stochastic; thus it is possible to increase the welfare of every generation using intergenerational transfers that might depend on the state of the world.

Subject: can market Created Date: 7/31/ PM. Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?: Antonio Rangel, Richard Zeckhauser (p.

- ) (bibliographic info) (download) (Working Paper version) by: A. Rangel, R. ZeckhauserCan market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing. John Campbell, Martin Feldstein (Eds.), Risk Aspects of Investment Based Social Security Reform, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (), pp.

Cited by: On Optimality of Intergenerational Risk Sharing. February ; Sufficient or necessary conditions for an allocation to be optimal are first obtained, extending an approach developed in Author: Gabrielle Demange.

On optimality of intergenerational risk sharing Gabrielle Demange1 DELTA, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, Paris, France [email protected] April 3, Abstract This paper deflnes and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic econ-omy with flnitely. Intergenerational risk-sharing and risk-taking of a pension fund Christian Gollier1 University of Toulouse (IDEI, TSE) Janu 1The author is grateful to Georges de M´enil, Peter Diamond, Jacques Dr`eze, Andy Posthelwaite, Eytan Sheshinski, Philippe Trainar, Alex White and two.

Intergenerational risk sharing. Abstract. In this paper we examine government debt and tax-transfer policies that can be improve the allocation of risk between generations.

Markets cannot allocate risk efficiently between two generations whenever the two generations are not both alive prior to the occurence of a stochastic by: Unlike most of the literature, we study both ex-ante and interim risk-sharing.

Our main conclusion is that both types of institutions have serious problems. Markets cannot generate ex-ante risk-sharing because agents can trade only after they are : Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauser.

BibTeX @MISC{Rangel99discussionof, author = {Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauser and Thomas J. Sargent}, title = {Discussion of "Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?" by Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauser}, year = {}}.

Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design Laurence Ball Johns Hopkins University N. Gregory Mankiw Harvard University This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy.

It compares the allocation of risk the economy. Rangel, R. ZeckhauserCan market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing. Campbell, M. Feldstein (Eds.), Risk Aspects of Investment Based Social Security Reform, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (), pp. Cited by: This raises the potential for intergenerational risk sharing – an issue discussed by, among others, Enders & Lapan () and Gordon & Varian ().

More recently, Attanasio and Davis () found compelling empirical evidence that the potential for risk sharing between different birth cohorts (and educational groups) is far from fully.

w Individual Risk and Intergenerational Risk Sharing in an Investment-Based Social Security Program Rangel and Zeckhauser Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing.

Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Aging. This section intends to provide a broad-based introduction to the analysis of IRS.

We start by describing the potential for risk sharing, after which we discuss the distinction between risk sharing and systematic redistribution. Then, we turn to Cited by: 2. Get this from a library. Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?.

[Antonio Rangel; Richard Zeckhauser; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- Abstract: Are market and voting institutions capable of producing optimal intergenerational risk-sharing.

To study this question, we consider a simple endowment economy with uncertainty and. Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, © (OCoLC) Material Type: Internet resource: Document Type: Book, Internet Resource: All Authors / Contributors: Antonio Rangel; Richard Zeckhauser; National Bureau of Economic Research.

erational correlation of income.1 These institutions may generate efficiency costs for the society. Second, we know even less about what the socially optimal intergenerational income cor-relation should be, what trade-offs it involves and how this socially optimal correlation may depend on alternative intertemporal welfare criteria.Endogenous Uncertainty and Market Volatility Mordecai Kurz and Maurizio Motolese An Information Theoretic Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance Masahiko Aoki Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?

Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauser.Intergenerational risk-sharing and risk-taking of a pension fund paper is to examine how and by how much such a prefunded system can solve the intergenerational risk-sharing inefficiency.

Such a funded system makes intergenerational risk-sharing possible if the trust funds can disconnect Workers determine their optimal portfolio risk in.